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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
•vs-
ROBERT ROMERO 
Defendant -A ppellant 
Case No. 12408 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Robert Romero, appeals from a conviction of burglary 
and theft, rendered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried by jury in front of the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
and appellant was found guilty of burglary and theft on July 30, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of burglary and theft 
and the dismissal of those charges against him. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of May 15, 1975, Russell and Jennifer Habeck left 
their apartment, returning that afternoon to find that their television, stereo, 
and antique scale were missing from their apartment. (R. 11). The appellant, 
Robert Romero, was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary and 
theft. 
At the trial, Russell Habeck testified that the value of the missing 
items was well over $250. 00 (R. 9-10). He and his wife also testified that 
they knew the appellant and considered him suspicious (R. 10-11). The 
Salt Lake City Police investigated the occurrance that evening (R. 32). Officer 
Clegg, the investigating officer, testified he could find no evidence of a 
forced entry in the back of the apartment, and was of the opinion that the bur-
glars had entered through the front door, perhaps by slipping the lock with 
a card (R. 33). Officer Clegg did not call in the crime lab to take finger-
prints, because in his opinion there were no areas that could be gainfully 
processed (R.33). That evening the Habecks and their two neighbors, Mary 
Juarez and Connie Waiters, discussed the incident and the possibility of the 
appellant's involvement (R. 52, 62). 
Mary Juarez lives next door to the Habecks and testified that 
at about 2:00 p. m. on the day in question she saw a van in front of the Habeckrs 
apartment, (R. 39-40), and that she watched two men go around to the back 
of the apartment and carry away several items (R. 40-41). She testified 
that she was acquainted with the appellant and recognized him as one of the 
burglars (R. 40-41). She also testified that she did not like appellant and 
that she thought he was "after" her daughter (R. 51). Connie Walters lives 
in the house next to Mary Juarez, and she testified that she saw a blue van 
with three men inside pull up in front of the Habeck's apartment and that two 
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men got out of the van and made several trips to and from the Habeck's 
apartment, carrying things away from the apartment and putting them into 
the van. (R. 57-59). Connie Walters also testified that she did not know 
appellant before the burglary and identified him as one of the burglars 
from his picture shown to her the next day by the police. (R. 59, 61-62). 
Defense witness Carol Salazar testified that the appellant was 
with her and several other people during the entire day of May 15, 1975, 
and that they had gone to the zoo and to Liberty Park. The appellant also 
testified that he was in the company of Carol Salazar and others during the 
day of May 15, 1975. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLAOT'S 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
THE CASE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH AS A MOTION OF LAW, THE DEFENDAOT'S 
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
In order to deny a motion to dismiss and allow the question of 
guilt to go to the jury, the prosecution must have introduced substantial 
evidence that the defendant was guilty. In this case the prosecution only 
showed substantially that a burglary and theft had occurred, but they failed 
to show by substantial evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of the 
crime. 
The question of whether or not the prosecution has born its burden 
is a difficult one. Wigmore cites the best statement to the test as . 
,Tf(The proposition) cannot be, Is there evidence?. . . The proposition 
seems to me to be this: Are there facts in evidence which if unanswered would 
justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming the question 
which the plaintiff is bound to maintain?™. 9 Wigmore 3d Ed. Section 2494. 
This statement has been cited by the Utah Supreme Court with approval. 
Seybold v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 121 Utah 6, 239 P. 2d 174, 177(1951); 
Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890, 892 (195 
In Seybold, a civil action against the Union Pacific Railroad for 
injuries suffered in a collision, this Court elaborated on Wigmore's statement 
saying that in order for the question to go to the trier of fact, there must 
be "substantial competent evidence upon which a jury acting fairly and reason-
ably can make the finding . . . But if the finding is so plainly unreasonable 
as to convince the Court that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make 
the finding, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial evidence." 121 
Utah6, 239 P. 2d 174, 177. 
In several criminal cases as well, this Court has spoken to the 
standard to be applied. In State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 167, 355 P. 2d 57 (1960), 
this Court affirmed conviction for first degree murder when the appeal 
focused on communications between the trial court and a juror. However, this 
Court also delineated the standard by which the question of substantial 
evidence should be reviewed, saying: 
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It is universally recognized that there is no jury question 
without substantial evidence indicating defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This requires evidence 
from which the jury could reasonably find the defendant 
guilty of all material issues of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Supra at 59. 
The appellant contends that no jury could have reasonably and 
fairly found the appellant guilty given the insubstantial evidence presented 
by the prosecution. 
The testimony of the victims of the burglary, Jennifer and Russell 
Habeck, shows only that certain items were missing from their apartment. 
On the other hand their testimony shows that they were prejudiced against 
the appellant before the burglary and theft took place. (R. 16, 24) They 
considered appellant to be suspicious and as having,fbad Karma". 
Officer Clegg, the investigating officer, testified that, in his 
professional judgment, the burglar had entered the apartment through the 
front door. (R. 33). He did not call in the crime lab to take fingerprints. 
Mary Juarez, the Habeck's neighbor, was the prosecutions next 
witness and her testimony was relied upon to identify the appellant as one 
of the perpetrators. Her testimony was so confusing, contradictory and 
prejudicial that it added nothing to the Prosecution's case. 
Mrs. Juarez's testimony was confusing in a number of ways. She 
testified at one point that she had gone to the back of her house to watch 
the burglars (R. 40), and later that she did not leave her house and instead 
watched from the windows. (R. 43). She testified that she saw the appellant 
clearly and could not see the other men well because their backs were 
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to her. (R. 42). Later she testified that they were carrying items out of the 
house facing her. (R. 50). She further testified at one point that she 
recognized one of the burglars as the appellant (R. 41), yet the appellant 
was not facing her and she could not estimate his height or weight, nor 
say whether he had a mustache. (R. 46). Still later she testified that he 
did have a beard. (R. 46). 
Mrs. Juarez's testimony contradicted other prosecution evidence 
as well. The most blatant contradiction is that she saw the burglars take 
a table from the apartment and put it in the van. (R. 40, 44). The Habecksf 
testimony of what was missing from their apartment did not include a table 
at all, yet Mary Juarez was positive that the burglars had carried away 
Ma little brown tablert (R. 44). Since the Habeck's had testified that the 
stereo turntable was missing, the only reasonable explanation is that 
Mrs. Juarez had heard that the turntable was missing and mistakenly thought 
it was a "table" and fabricated the entire episode of the "table". Mrs. 
Juarez's testimony also contradicts Officer Cieggrs theory that the burglars 
must have entered through the front door. Mrs. Juarez continually testified 
that the burglars went around the back and returned carrying items. 
(R. 40, 43-44). Her testimony also contradicted Connie Walters' testimony 
in that she maintained that the van was gray. (R. 42, 55). Connie Walters 
testified that it was blue. (R. 58, 60). ; 
Finally, Mrs. Juarez's testimony was admittedly interested and 
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prejudiced Not only did she testify that she was a good friend of the 
Habecks (R. 51), but she testified that she didn't like the appellant because 
she thought he was trying to "fool aroundtf with her daughter, (R. 51). 
Q. (B)ut by testifying today, do you think that this will 
solve the problem that you think you had with Mr. Romero 
and your daughter? 
A. I guess it is. (R. 56). 
Mrs. Juarez further showed her prejudice by admitting that she did not like 
Mr. Romero. (R. 51). Mrs. Juarez also admitted that that evening after 
the burglary, Mrs. Habeck had suggested to her that the burglar was the 
appellant and that they had discussed the burglary. Her prejudice was shown 
again by her statement that the appellant was "coming aroundf? after her 
daughter, "lying and saying he was Richard Romero. M (R. 51). 
The final prosecution witness, Connie Walters, was also relied 
upon by the prosecution to identify the appellant as the burglar. Her 
testimony was so interested and insubstantial that it added nothing to the 
prosecution's case. It was insubstantial in that (1) she couldn't remember 
the date of the occurrence (R. 60); (2) she was two houses away from the 
Habeck's apartment (R. 60); (3) she couldn't remember what the burglar 
she identified as the defendant was wearing (R. 63), yet she said she could 
identify the burglar as Robert Romero (R. 61); and (4) she testified that she 
never saw the burglar carry away the missing antique scale, nor the television 
set. (R. 61). 
Her testimony was interested and tainted because she was a 
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good friend of the Habecks (R. 64) and because the evening of the 
burglary she talked with the Habecks and Mary Juarez and they told 
her that they thought the burglar was the defendant. (R. 63). 
Finally, it should be noted that the defense presented the alibi 
that Robert Romero was in the company of Carol Salazar and others the 
entire day of May 15, 1975, and could not have been involved in the offense. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the prosecution only made a substantial showing 
that the Habecks had been burglarized. But they failed to show by 
substantial evidence that the appellant was connected with the burglary. 
Mary Juarez1 and Connie Walters' identification of the appellant was so 
tainted that from it a jury could not fairly or reasonably conclude that the 
appellant was guilty of the burglary and theft. The question of fairness should 
be emphasized here becuase of the prejudicial nature of their testimony. 
As discussed above the question is not whether there is any 
evidence of guilty, but whether there is substantial evidence of guilt in 
order for the question to go to the jury. Therefore it was error for the 
trial court to deny the appellant's motion for dismissal at the close of the 
prosecution's case. Appellant respectfully submits that the case should be 
reversed and the charges against appellant dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN A. WHITE 
